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  In the Commonwealth nations, a constitutional “convention” denotes an unwritten but 
obligatory constitutional custom or norm. Leading examples are the conventions that the Queen 
act only on ministerial advice, and that whichever party obtains a majority in the House of 
Commons is entitled to form a government. Such rules are not written down in any authoritative 
enacted source of law, but they are fundamental to the operation of the British constitution. Other 
Commonwealth nations have similar unwritten rules. 
In the United States, it has recently become clear that – despite the existence of a written 
constitution  –  conventions  are  essential  to  the  operation  of  the  U.S.  constitutional  regime, 
including the administrative state. This revelation bursts upon American constitutional scholars 
every other generation or so,
1 and is lost in the succeeding generation. Perhaps because of this 
oddly intermittent collective memory, there is no full-dress treatment in the U.S. constitutional 
law literature, as far as I am aware, of a critical set of questions on which Commonwealth 
theorists have thought very deeply: whether and when conventions should be enforceable in 
court.  There  is  discussion  of  bits  and  pieces  of  the  question  under  various  rubrics,  such  as 
legislative acquiescence,
2 “glossing” the Constitution through practice or custom, and so forth.
3 
However, in the view I will sketch, these are only particular aspects or special cases of the larger 
problem.  
The  question  I  will  address  is  whether  public  law  in  the  United  States  should  be 
understood  to  permit,  require  or  forbid  federal  courts  to  incorporate  conventions  into  their 
decisions.  My  major  claim  is  that  public  law  should  adopt  an  approach  that  has  achieved 
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1 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick Schauer ed.) (2011). 
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consensus status in the United Kingdom and Commonwealth – what I will call the “modern 
Commonwealth  view.”  This  approach  holds  that  while  courts  may  and  should  recognize 
conventions, they may not and should not enforce them. (In  an alternative description, courts 
may  enforce  conventions  “indirectly”  but  not  “directly.”  That  alternative  description  is 
substantively equivalent for my purposes, as explained later; it makes no practical difference 
which formulation one prefers.) 
I will illustrate and clarify the distinction between recognition and enforcement in what 
follows. The important point is that the main strength of the modern Commonwealth view is that 
it is not either of two other leading views, which I will call the “classical Diceyan view” and the 
“incorporationist  view”  respectively.  The  classical  Diceyan  view,  which  attempts  to  ignore 
conventions altogether, is untenable in the conditions of the modern administrative state. On the 
other hand, the incorporationist view, which is hospitable to vigorous judicial enforcement of 
conventions,  is  suspect  on  democratic  grounds.  Conventions  are  obligations  that  arise  in  a 
decentralized  fashion,  welling  up  out  of  the  equilibrium  interaction  of  political  forces;  that 
feature undermines the deliberateness, responsiveness and accountability that lawmaking in a 
democratic constitutional order requires. 
I will argue that the two competing views are untenable in the modern administrative 
state, and that the modern Commonwealth view triumphs faute de mieux – for lack of a better, or 
even any feasible, alternative. Moreover, I will claim that in important cases, especially recent 
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly moved toward just this approach. Although U.S. 
law is hardly uniform or consistent on the subject, adopting the modern Commonwealth view in 
the U.S. would not represent a radical novelty. 
It is tempting to assume that the best approach to conventions somehow must differ 
between  Commonwealth  settings  and  the  U.S.  setting  because  of  the  large  background 
differences between the U.S. public law regime and typical Commonwealth regimes. The U.S. 
has distinctive features such as a formal separation of executive and legislative powers, and a 
written constitution that purports to be comprehensive (although it is not, as we will see). The 
Commonwealth  regimes  typically  feature  parliamentary  government,  and  in  many  cases, 
specifically the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada, the constitution is either unwritten 
or, at most, only partially codified. Despite these important background differences, however, I Conventions in Court 
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believe that the treatment of conventions has tended and in fact should tend to converge across 
systems because of one massive feature the systems share: the administrative state. The network 
of statutes and regulations, including both ordinary statutes and quasi-constitutional statutes, has 
grown so dense in both systems that it is no longer possible for conventions to remain in a 
separate  realm  outside  the  legal  system.  In  either  regime,  courts  interpreting  written 
constitutional provisions, statutes or regulations have no choice but to navigate through and 
around conventions, and in order to do so, courts must recognize conventions. Yet courts are 
under no such necessity to actively enforce conventions, and I will argue that on normative 
grounds they should not. 
It should be apparent that the argument for the modern Commonwealth view will have a 
distinctly nonideal cast. Given the constraints that courts face in the administrative state, the best 
of  the  feasible  alternatives  is  to  recognize  conventions  but  not  enforce  them.  The  modern 
Commonwealth  view,  in  other  words,  is  an  unhappy  compromise  among  competing 
considerations; its final, and indeed only, real virtue is that it is less unhappy than the competing 
views. Though this claim is not inspiring, I hope that it is true. 
Part  I  will  briefly  lay  out  some  necessary  background,  including  a  definition  of 
conventions,  a  taxonomic  framework  for  discussing  conventions,  and  an  explanation  of  the 
competing approaches I will discuss. Part II explains the institutional and normative problems – 
in my view insuperable problems – that afflict both the classical Diceyan view of convention and 
the incorporationist view, for different reasons. The modern Commonwealth view prevails on 
nonideal grounds, as the best feasible approach given the constraints under which courts operate 
in the administrative state. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. Background 
A. What Are “Conventions”?  
  In the American constitutional order, it is a mistake to think that all constitutional rules 
are  written.  First  of  all,  there  is  a  domain  of  “constitutional  common  law”  made  by  judges 
deciding federal constitutional questions.
4 Such law is in one sense written down in judicial 
opinions, but is unwritten in another deeper sense, insofar as – on one important view -- the rules 
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of common law have no single authoritative formulation.
5 Bracketing questions about the status 
of constitutional common law, however, there is a large body of constitutional rules that are even 
more clearly unwritten. Here are some standard examples. In a number of cases I will leave out, 
for now, exceptions and complications that I will mention later in the discussion: 
  • Before Franklin Roosevelt obtained a third consecutive presidential term in 1940, there 
was a convention holding that no one could be elected to more than two terms – because George 
Washington had stepped down after his second.
6 
  • Although the constitutional framers expected that members of the Electoral College 
would vote independently, by the middle of the 19
th century it had become a firm convention that 
electors were duty-bound to vote for the candidate of the party who selected them.
7 
  • Under Thomas Jefferson, it became a convention that the President would not offer the 
State  of  the  Union  Address  orally  in  person,  but  would  communicate  it  in  writing.  The 
convention was stood on its head when Woodrow Wilson delivered the address in person; the 
current convention is that it is obligatory for the President to do so.
8  
  • For some period of time starting in the 1990s, the Republican Party in the House of 
Representatives,  when  it  controlled  the  House,  followed  an  internal  convention  called  the 
“Hastert Rule”: no legislation would be approved unless a majority of the majority party voted in 
favor. The convention thus excluded approval by a majority comprising the minority party plus a 
minority of the majority party.
9 
  • Administrative lawyers define an “independent” agency as an agency whose heads 
cannot be discharged at will by the President. Although relevant statutes do not give any such 
tenure protection to the Chair of the Federal Reserve or to the Commissioners of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, both are universally understood to be independent agencies. Their 
                                                 
5 Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455 (1989).  
6 Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-
Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565 (1998-1999). 
7 Note, State Power to Bind Presidential Electors, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1965). 
8 Adrian Vermeule, The Small-C Constitution, Circa 1925, JOTWELL CLASSICS, (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://classic.jotwell.com/the-small-c-constitution-circa-1925/. 
9 Sotirios A. Barber, Toward a More Responsible Congress? Congress and Responsible Government, 89 B.U.L. 
REV. 357 (2009).  Conventions in Court 
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independence rests on an unwritten convention that protects them from discharge without cause, 
whatever the relevant statutes say.
10 
  • The Justices of the Supreme Court follow a “Rule of Four” for deliberation on certiorari 
petitions. Although technically speaking the Court acts by majority vote, if there are four votes to 
grant a petition, it will be deemed granted. (The underlying fiction seems to be that one of the 
Justices  in  the  five-member  bloc  who  voted  to  deny  certiorari  will  switch  to  provide  the 
necessary additional vote.) The Rule of Four is wholly unwritten.
11 
Do these unwritten rules have any common features? How, if at all, do they differ from 
“rules” like these: 
• Candidates for office should cater to the extremes in the primary, but to the center in 
the general election;  
• Male candidates should wear a suit and tie at debates;  
•  When  politicians  step  down  from  office,  they  almost  invariably  claim  that  the 
motivation is to spend more time with their families; 
• Every year, the President pardons a turkey on Thanksgiving Day. 
There is a myriad of conceptual puzzles about these examples, problems that bedevil 
philosophers and students of jurisprudence. From the practical lawyer’s standpoint, however, the 
problem is to disentangle three sorts of action:  
(1)  Action  that  is  essentially  contingent  and  circumstantial,  a  product  of  the  specific 
situation at hand. In some circumstances, one political party will favor a certain foreign military 
intervention, or a certain domestic farm policy, but we would not be surprised if the parties were 
to flip their positions over time, as circumstances shift. 
(2) Action that is regular, but does not rest on any sense of normative obligation. This 
sort of action may rest on rules of thumb rather than rules in any stronger sense. It is a very 
useful rule of thumb that a politician leaving office will do well to claim that the motive is to 
spend time with family, but there is no normative obligation attached to that, and there are cases 
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in which it is advantageous for the politician to say something else, for instance that she is 
stepping down to protest violation of some high principle. Regular action without normative 
obligation may also reflect a pure ritual without the normative aura of tradition. The President’s 
pardoning  of  a  turkey  on  Thanksgiving  falls  in  this  category.  No  one  (sensible)  would  be 
outraged if a President discontinued the practice. 
(3) Action that is both regular and rests on a sense of normative obligation. The relevant 
sense of obligation may take different forms. In one form, political actors fear sanctions for 
breaching the convention. The sanctions need not be judicially-enforced sanctions like damages, 
fines or imprisonment; on the classical account of conventions, the relevant sanctions are strictly 
extra-judicial,  and  involve  political  opprobrium,  retaliation  or  refusal  to  cooperate  by  the 
opposing  political  party,  public  backlash  and  ultimately  electoral  defeat  at  the  hands  of  a 
disapproving  public  or  pivotal  fraction  thereof.  In  another  form,  the  obligation  is  genuinely 
internalized  by  political  actors  who  believe  that  political  morality  requires  them  to  act  in 
accordance with the convention. Indeed, internalization may be so profound that it does not even 
occur to the actor that it is possible to violate the convention, in which case the convention has 
attained a kind of cognitive hegemony.  
All  these  forms  of  obligation  are  extremely  difficult  for  an  outside  observer  to 
distinguish; in the extreme they will be observationally equivalent. A political actor who obeys a 
convention solely out of rationally self-interested fear of sanctions may well claim to be doing so 
out of deeply felt principles of political morality, especially if so claiming is costless. Yet there is 
no  doubt  that  in  some  cases,  political  actors  really  do  obey  conventions  out  of  deeply  felt 
principles of political morality. Were that not so, then the mimicking of those sincere actors by 
insincere actors would be pointless and ineffective. 
Having distinguished these three types of action, there is a semantic morass into which 
the discussion frequently stumbles: which of (1), (2) or (3) should we call “political”? In a deep 
sense, all of these are of course thoroughly political. In a shallow sense, however, it is perfectly 
good English to reserve “politics” for the circumstantial jousting of partisans (case (1)), for rules 
that do not rest on a sense of normative obligation (case (2)), or for both. I will do exactly that, 
while using “convention” to denote regularities of political behavior that are backed by a sense 
of obligation (case (3)). Conventions in Court 
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To summarize, I will define conventions as (1) unwritten rules of political behavior that 
are (2) widely acknowledged and regularly followed from (3) a sense of obligation -- either (3A) 
a thin sense of obligation resting on a credible threat of sanctions or (3B) a thick sense of 
obligation resting on internalized precepts of political morality.
12 There are a half-dozen terms 
that loiter in the neighborhood of conventions -- practices, customs, norms, etiquette and so on -- 
and one might waste a lifetime diagramming the family relationships among these. But American 
lawyers tend to use “custom” and even “practice” to mean normatively freighted customs or 
practices, so those terms are rough synonyms for convention. I will blithely skirt the whole 
semantic morass and treat custom, practice and convention as interchangeable shorthand for the 
definition I have given, unless context clearly dictates otherwise. 
This definition is intended to capture the mainstream view in the modern Commonwealth 
theory  of  conventions.  Different  writers  invariably  put  things  somewhat  differently,  but  the 
common elements are, very broadly, a regular political behavior backed by a sense of obligation, 
or opinio juris. (International lawyers will see here the main elements of internal customary law, 
which I will later touch upon very briefly.) There is one strand in Commonwealth theory that 
goes further, however. In this strand, stemming from Sir Ivor Jennings, conventions must also 
rest on good reasons.
13 I believe that this strand is mistaken, and deeply so; it misunderstands 
what conventions are and what roles they play in a constitutional polity. Conventions always 
have a coordination component, in addition to whatever distributive component they may or may 
not have. Requiring that there be “a reason for the rule,” as the Jennings approach does, assumes 
away  the  problem  of  disagreement  over  good  reasons  that  creates  the  need  for  rule-based 
coordination in the first place. It is because political actors do not fully agree about the reasons 
for rules that there have to be rules at all. I return to this issue later; suffice it to say here that the 
Jennings approach is not widely accepted.
14 
Finally,  I  will  limit  the  discussion  to  extrajudicial  conventions.  The  example  of  the 
Supreme Court’s Rule of Four for certiorari petitions, given earlier, illustrates conventions that 
arise and operate within the judicial system itself. There are many such conventions, but they are 
                                                 
12 For the details, see Vermeule supra note 10. 
13 W. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 136 (5th ed. 1959). 
14 COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TEXT AND MATERIALS, 161 
(“[t]his approach [i.e. the Jennings approach] while in many respects commendable, is not authoritative.”) (6
th ed. 
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not my concern here. The hardest and most consequential issue for public law is whether, and 
when, judges may incorporate into their decisions conventions that arise among extrajudicial 
political actors, such as executive and legislative officials, voters and political parties. All the 
conventions I will discuss in what follows arise extrajudicially in that sense. 
B. Conventions, Law and Judging: Major Positions 
Armed with this background definition of conventions, the main issue I mean to address 
is  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  extrajudicial  conventions  should  be  enforceable  in  court  by 
judges. This is not the same as the jurisprudential question whether conventions count as “law.” 
It is certainly possible to hold, for example, that conventions count as “law”, but that they should 
not  be  enforced  by  courts,  or  not  all  of  them  should  be  anyway.  In  an  American  setting, 
particularly, it is clear that there are rules of “law” that are obligatory on nonjudicial actors but 
are  not  enforced  by  courts,  due  to  limitations  of  justiciability.
15  It  is  then  an  open  question 
whether conventions fall into the set of such rules of law, but that question I need not and do not 
address as such. Conversely, one might deny that extrajudicial conventions count as law, but go 
on to say that (some) such conventions should be enforced by judges anyway; after all, on some 
leading jurisprudential approaches, judges are not limited to enforcing law, but may also enforce 
norms of political morality. I have no stake whatsoever in questions of that sort. Whether or not 
extrajudicial conventions count as law, the question remains whether and when federal courts in 
the United States should enforce them. 
As to that question, I will examine three major approaches – the classical Diceyan view, 
the incorporationist view, and the modern Commonwealth view. 
  The  classical  Diceyan  view.  The  classical  approach  in  Commonwealth  legal  theory, 
stemming from the pre-eminent Victorian theorist Albert Venn Dicey, holds that conventions 
“are not enforced or enforceable by the Courts.”
16 Enacted written rules, including both statutes 
and  administrative  lawmaking  and  common  law  rules  are  all  enforceable  in  court.  (Dicey’s 
theory was keyed to a stipulative definition of “law,” according to which conventions did not 
count as “law” and were not enforceable in court for that reason. Again, however, I have no stake 
                                                 
15 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (2013). 
16 Roger E. Michener, Foreword to A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
15 (ed. Roger E. Michener, Liberty Fund 1982), available at 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1714/Dicey_0125_EBk_v7.0.pdf. Conventions in Court 
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in  that  and  the  issue  is  entirely  dispensable  for  my  purposes).  On  this  view,  constitutional 
conventions are unwritten but obligatory political customs that are enforced directly by the threat 
of  political  sanctions  --  principally  public  blaming  and  shaming,  tit-for-tat  retaliation  by  an 
opposing political party or electoral defeat. The striking consequence of the Diceyan view is that 
Commonwealth  lawyers  sometimes  say  that  a  given  statute  or  government  action  would  be 
“legal but unconstitutional” -- a seeming oxymoron to the American-trained lawyer. 
  A wrinkle is that Dicey sometimes said that breach of a convention would inevitably, 
sooner or later, require the offender to breach an enforceable legal rule and thus expose himself 
to legal sanctions.
17 But Dicey gave no convincing general reason to think that was so. There are 
straightforward examples in which it is not so, such as a breach of the convention of ministerial 
responsibility; and Dicey himself sometimes acknowledged that a convention might rest solely 
on nonlegal sanctions.
18 
  The closest American analogue of the Diceyan view is a dissent by Justice Jackson in 
Ray v. Blair,
19 a neglected -- but theoretically crucial -- case that asked whether and how the 
originally intended constitutional independence of the Electoral College can be squared with the 
ironclad  convention  that  presidential  electors  must  vote  for  the  nominee  of  their  party.  The 
Court, referring to the convention, upheld a state law requiring candidates in a Democratic party 
primary for nomination as an elector to pledge to vote on partisan grounds. Justice Jackson 
dissented vigorously, arguing that such a pledge was foreign to the constitutional text and its 
purposes, and that “[a] political practice which has its origin in custom must rely upon custom 
for  its  sanctions.”
20  Conventions,  in  other  words,  should  be  enforced  solely  by  nonjudicial 
means. 
  The incorporationist view. Jackson’s Diceyan position in Ray v. Blair is something of an 
outlier.  American  law  has  long  said  that  constitutional  rules  may  be  developed  through 
“liquidation”
21 or “practical construction” through the interaction of the nonjudicial branches, 
and that judges may incorporate the resulting normatively freighted practices or customs into 
their decisions. On this view, conventions are straightforwardly incorporated into the law, and 
                                                 
17 Id. at 319. 
18 Id. at 443 n.15. 
19 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
20 Id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
21 Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). Conventions in Court 
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are  straightforwardly  judicially  enforceable  in  whatever  ways,  and  to  the  extent  that,  other 
sources of law are judicially enforceable. Cross-cutting limitations on enforceability -- standing, 
the political question doctrine, and so on -- might apply when relevant, but conventions would 
not be special in that regard. 
  The incorporationist view comes in two varieties, weak and strong. In the weak version, 
conventions may be incorporated into the constitutional law only when the constitutional text is 
general, vague or ambiguous, but may not be used to override clear and specific text.
22 Justice 
Jackson, shifting his ground, also suggested such a view in dissent in Ray v. Blair.  “Usage,” he 
said, “may sometimes impart changed content to constitutional generalities, such as ‘due process 
of law,’ ‘equal protection,’ or ‘commerce among the states,’”
23 but not otherwise. As we will see, 
this weak version of the incorporationist view is compatible with the modern Commonwealth 
view of conventions, which I will outline and defend.  
However, there is also a much stronger version of the incorporationist view – a version 
that, as we will see, cannot be squared with the modern Commonwealth approach. In this strong 
version of incorporationism, usage itself helps to define meaning. In some moods, the Court will 
say things like “in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall 
be  given  to  the  usage  itself,  even  when  the  validity  of  the  practice  is  the  subject  of 
investigation.”
24 Whereas the weak version is in effect a canon of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation that applies when constitutional or statutory provisions are otherwise vague, silent 
or ambiguous, the strong version holds that usage or practice is itself among the sources that 
judges should use to decide whether the relevant provision is silent or ambiguous in the first 
place. The strong view is highly consequential and theoretically significant. For one thing, it 
directly contradicts the putative distinction between “interpretation” and construction that some 
theorists  of  legal  interpretation  endorse.  On  that  account,  interpretation  looks  only  to  the 
semantic meaning of the provision, while construction looks to practices and usages on the part 
                                                 
22 This may be what Justice Frankfurter meant in the Steel Seizure cases, when he wrote that “[d]eeply embedded 
traditional ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to 
the words of a text or supply them.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) 
(concurring opinion).  As usual with Frankfurter, however, the fog of words makes it hard to be sure. For state cases 
standing for the general proposition that custom cannot override clear statutory meaning, see U.S. cases cited in 
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 105 (2010). 
23 Ray, 343 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
24 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915). Conventions in Court 
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of interpreters.
25 The strong view, however, denies that there is any meaning apart from practice 
or usage. 
  The modern Commonwealth view. In recent decades, modern Commonwealth theorists 
have converged on an updated view that adapts and modifies Dicey to fit a more complicated 
world in which conventions constantly interact with statutes. Here, the key distinction is between 
judicial recognition of conventions, on the one hand, and on the other judicial enforcement of 
conventions as a freestanding source of legal claims.
26 The modern view holds that judicial 
recognition  of  conventions  is  permissible,  indeed  sometimes  inescapable,  but  that  judicial 
enforcement of conventions is impermissible. 
  A  standard  illustration  in  Commonwealth  legal  theory  is  a  decision  of  the  Canadian 
Supreme Court called the “Patriation Reference.”
27 The issues in the case were complex; the 
Court  faced  a  battery  of  questions  posed  by  the  federal  government  and  various  provinces. 
Simplified, however, the main issue was whether the Parliament of Canada needed the consent of 
all, or at least a large supermajority, of Canadian provinces in order to request constitutional 
changes  from  the  United  Kingdom  Parliament  as  to  matters  affecting  relations  between  the 
Canadian federal government and the provincial governments.  
The Justices of the Supreme Court decided three points, by two different majorities. One 
majority  held  that  there  was  no  legal  restriction  in  constitutional  law  that  would  require 
provincial consent for such a request. A different majority held that (1) there was a constitutional 
convention requiring provincial consent; and, critically, that (2) the proper role of courts is to 
recognize  but  not  enforce  the  convention.
28  At  the  aggregate  level  of  the  whole  Court,  the 
outcome was a sharp contrast between law and convention, combined with a willingness on the 
judges’ part to recognize conventions even while refusing to enforce them. 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 409 (2009).  
26 GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
15 (rev. paperback ed. 1986). 
27 See Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 807, 909 (Can.) (recognizing but 
refusing to enforce convention that Parliament will not propose any measure to amend Constitution of Canada that 
affects federal-provincial relations without agreement of provinces). 
28 Id. at 759-60. Conventions in Court 
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Two  issues  involving  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  illustrate  the 
distinction between recognition and enforcement in the U.S. setting. Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public  Companies  Accounting  Oversight  Board  examined  the  constitutionality  of  the  Public 
Companies  Accounting  Oversight  Board  (PCAOB),
29  an  independent  body  whose  members 
could be discharged only for cause. The PCAOB was nestled within an agency, the SEC, which 
was also independent in the sense that its commissioners could be discharged only for cause – or 
so the parties stipulated. In permitting that stipulation, and assuming its validity for purposes of 
the decision, the Court indirectly recognized the existence of a convention making the SEC 
commissioners dischargeable only for cause.
30 That recognition was the necessary predicate for 
the Court’s holding, which was that the statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it created 
two  nested  levels  of  independence;  it  made  the  PCAOB  independent  of,  and  within,  the 
independent SEC. Absent the unwritten convention that the SEC is independent of the President, 
only a single layer of insulation would have been present. 
The convention of SEC independence explains why the SEC appears on every list of 
“independent” agencies. Yet the relevant statute actually gives the Commissioners no tenure 
protection whatsoever, and the Court has been clear that the default rule for interpreting agency 
organic statutes requires Congress to speak expressly to give officials for-cause tenure (unless 
the officials exercise solely adjudicative functions, unlike the SEC).
31 Despite the convention, 
imagine that the President discharged an SEC Commissioner without offering cause, and a suit 
for  back  pay  were  brought  in  an  attempt  to  enforce  the  convention  directly  –  the  standard 
procedural posture in cases on the constitutionality of independent agencies.
32 Would the Court 
treat the SEC as an independent agency? 
Given the precedents on executive tenure, the Court would almost certainly deny the 
claim. There is a clear and consistent line of precedents, both judicial precedents from the Court 
and opinions from the office of Legal Counsel, stating that at-will tenure is the default norm for 
federal  officers,  so  that  Congress  must  speak  clearly  to  confer  for-cause  tenure.  The  only 
exception that the Court has recognized – the only case in which the Court has implied for-cause 
                                                 
29 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). 
30 See Vermeule, supra note 10 for further discussion. 
31  President’s Authority to Remove the Chairman of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), 2001 WL 
34089651 (O.L.C. July 31, 2001); Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 
U.S. 311 (1903).  
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tenure – involved an agency deliberately modeled on the Article III judiciary, an agency that 
exercised strictly adjudicative functions.
33 There are a couple of older lower-court cases that read 
implied for-cause tenure into the organic statutes of agencies with nonadjudicatory functions,
34 
but those decisions were confessedly dicta,
35 and are of dubious authority today. The upshot is 
that the Roberts Court – the same Court that allowed the parties to stipulate to SEC independence 
as a collateral issue in PCAOB – is most unlikely to enforce the convention in its own right. SEC 
independence may be recognized, but will not be enforced.  
Likewise,  even  though  there  is  a  powerful  convention  that  the  chair  of  the  Federal 
Reserve qua chair is independent of the executive, there is no statutory basis whatsoever for 
affording the chair any form of legal tenure qua chair.
36 As a consequence, I believe that were 
the President to fire a Fed chair mid-term, the Court would leave the convention to rely upon 
political enforcement for its sanctions, a la Jackson, and would refuse to rule the discharge 
illegal. The convention here is so powerful, however, that the thought experiment is probably 
fated never to be realized. As is ordinarily the case with conventions, the more forceful they are, 
the less likely they are to be violated, so the less likely there is to be a legal case arising out of 
their violation, and the harder it is to be sure what courts would do. 
Similarities  and  differences.  The  distinction  between  recognition  and  enforcement  is 
intended to bar judicial enforcement of conventions as freestanding claims, meaning claims that 
might operate in court apart from, or even inconsistently with, enacted law or common law. But 
what is the cash value of identifying this modern Commonwealth view? What, if anything, is the 
difference between (1) the modern Commonwealth view and the Diceyan view; (2) the modern 
Commonwealth view and the incorporationist view – in either its weak or strong version? 
In  the  classical  Diceyan  view,  conventions  are  ignored  altogether.  The  existence  and 
content of conventions are treated as “political” or “nonlegal” questions, and it is assumed that 
courts may only enforce or even recognize legal claims. In the Patriation Reference, it had been 
argued – and some lower-court judges had concluded – that the courts could not even recognize 
the relevant convention of federal-provincial relations, on the grounds that the whole subject 
                                                 
33 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).  
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35 Swan, 100 F.3d at 981-83; FEC, 6 F.3d at 826. 
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presented  a  strictly  “political”  question.
37  The  Canadian  Supreme  Court  rejected  this  claim, 
holding that the statutes defining the Court’s jurisdiction allowed it to discuss conventions, even 
when  not  enforcing  them.
38  This  position  exemplifies  the  modern  Commonwealth  view;  it 
relaxes the classical Diceyan distinction between law and politics partway, but only partway. It 
allows  courts  to  recognize  conventions  for  certain  purposes  and  in  certain  ways,  but  not  to 
enforce them as freestanding obligations. 
The trickier question is the relationship between the modern Commonwealth view and 
the incorporationist view. It is clear that the strong version of incorporationism is inconsistent 
with the modern Commonwealth view. To make a convention constitutive of the very meaning 
of  a  constitutional  or  statutory  text  is,  in  effect  if  not  in  name,  to  give  it  independent 
constitutional or statutory force in its own right. At a minimum, then, there is that important 
difference between the modern Commonwealth view and one version of the incorporationist 
position.  
The harder issue, though, is whether the Commonwealth view is inconsistent with the 
soft  version  of  incorporationism,  in  which  conventions  may  be  used  only  to  fill  in  gaps  or 
ambiguities  in  constitutional  or  statutory  text.  Is  this  a  form  of  recognition  or  a  form  of 
enforcement? I believe it is not enforcement in the sense condemned by the Commonwealth 
view. The nub of the Commonwealth view is that conventions are not to be enforced by courts as 
freestanding  obligations.
39  When  conventions  are  used  as  context  for  the  interpretation  of 
enacted texts, however, that injunction is not violated. Rather, the convention’s force is entirely 
ancillary to, and derivative of, the force of the written text. I will return to this issue shortly. 
C. Puzzles about Recognition and Enforcement 
  The distinction between judicial recognition of conventions and judicial enforcement of 
conventions is the sort of distinction that pervades law: clear enough at the extremes, fuzzy at the 
boundary. I do not at all claim that the distinction is self-applying, or that all cases under the 
distinction will be easy ones. The only question is whether, as a practical matter, the distinction 
                                                 
37 Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, at 774. 
38 Id. at 847-48. 
39 Thus arguments for direct enforcement of conventions by judges, see, e.g., Mark Elliott, Parliamentary 
Sovereignty and the New Constitutional Order: Legislative Freedom, Political Reality, and Convention, 22 LEGAL 
STUD. 340 (2002), go beyond the current consensus. They are best understood as bids to forge a new consensus that 
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manages  to  do  a  rough  but  tolerable  job  of  sorting  out  undesirable  from  desirable  judicial 
behaviors. 
  All that said, we can make some progress on clarifying the distinction by proceeding on 
two fronts. First, I will compare and contrast the distinction to three other distinctions in the 
neighborhood: direct vs. indirect use of conventions; law vs. fact; and injunction vs. damages. 
Second, I will elaborate on the point and purpose of the distinction. 
  Other distinctions. The nub of the distinction between recognition and enforcement is that 
courts will not enforce conventions as freestanding claims. Is that the same as, or different than, 
a  distinction  between  giving  conventions  indirect  effect  and  direct  effect?  There  is  another 
semantic tangle here, but one that ultimately does not affect the substance of the issues. 
The  semantic  tangle  is  that  the  use  of  conventions  as  interpretive  context  might  be 
described, and sometimes is described by Commonwealth theorists, as “indirect” enforcement as 
opposed to “direct” enforcement.
40 If those terms are used, then the Commonwealth approach 
would hold that indirect enforcement is permissible, whereas direct enforcement – enforcement 
as a freestanding obligation, not ancillary to the interpretation of an enacted written text – is not. 
For purposes of my discussion here, nothing of substance turns on which description is chosen. It 
does  not  matter,  for  any  of  the  examples  I  shall  discuss,  whether  we  understand  the 
Commonwealth  view  as  drawing  a  line  between  recognition  and  enforcement,  or  instead  as 
drawing a line between indirect and direct enforcement. In either case, the forbidden move, the 
thing that lies beyond the pale, is the same; conventions are not to be treated as freestanding 
obligations that are judicially enforceable in their own right.  
In Free Enterprise Fund, as discussed earlier, the Court used the convention of SEC 
independence  as  crucial  context  for  interpreting  the  relevant  statutes.  The  hypothetical  case 
arising out of that decision involved an SEC Commissioner, discharged without cause, who 
attempts  to  bring  a  suit  to  block  the  discharge,  invoking  the  unwritten  convention  of  SEC 
independence. That attempt might be described in two ways: either as an attempt to enforce the 
convention, in contrast to the Court’s recognition of the convention, or instead as an attempt to 
enforce the convention “directly,” in contrast to the Court’s “indirect” enforcement-through-
interpretation in Free Enterprise Fund. But in either case, the hypothetical Commissioner’s claim 
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is the paradigmatic case that the distinction between recognition and enforcement is meant to 
exclude. In what follows I will ignore this semantic issue, and use the language of recognition 
and enforcement throughout. 
A second relevant distinction is between law and fact, and that distinction presents a 
more complex problem. The complexity arises because there is no simple answer to the question 
whether conventions should be understood as “law” or “fact.” It all depends on the purposes for 
which  the  question  is  asked,  and  by  whom  the  question  is  asked.  From  the  standpoint  of 
extrajudicial  actors,  conventions  have  the  same  obligatory  character  as  do  constitutional  or 
statutory texts or common-law rules, and that sense of obligation may rest on either the fear of 
sanctions  or  internalized  respect  for  the  relevant  rules,  just  as  in  the  case  of  judicially-
enforceable law. In that sense, it is perfectly sensible to say that conventions count as law, a form 
of law that applies outside of courts,
41 although for my purposes I have no need either to confirm 
or deny that thesis. From the standpoint of judges, however, the existence and content of an 
extrajudicial convention are issues to which there is an answer, independent of what judges 
think. In that sense, “the law will treat the existence of a convention as simply a question of 
fact—though not a simple question of fact—since the conclusion may need to be established by a 
complex process involving both argument and historical exegesis.”
42 Thus conventions may be 
seen  as  either  law-like  or  fact-like,  depending  upon  one’s  institutional  role,  perspective  and 
purposes. 
Finally, the distinction between injunctive relief and damages is entirely unrelated to the 
distinction  between  recognition  and  enforcement  of  conventions.  As  I  will  mention  shortly, 
recognition of a convention is more akin to a declaratory judgment than to either of the coercive 
forms of relief. Were conventions to be enforced by judicially-administered sanctions, a further 
question would arise about what sort of sanctions ought to be applied, but that is not the view I 
suggest in any event. 
  Why recognition but not enforcement? The more fundamental question is why courts 
should make such a distinction in the first place. The distinction serves two positive purposes. 
The first purpose is to harmonize conventions with the enacted law, and vice-versa. Even if one 
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believes that enacted law is necessarily superior to convention, still it is impossible for judges to 
sensibly navigate the landscape of public law without awareness and recognition of conventions. 
Thus Nicholas Barber argues, with respect to the United Kingdom setting, that recognition of 
conventions is indispensable to the interpretation of statutes:  
[j]udges can use conventions as an interpretative aid to clarify the meaning of statutes. 
Sometimes  statutes  make  reference  to  conventions,  and  interpretation  of  the  statute 
requires an interpretation of the convention. Sometimes statutes are passed in the context 
of conventions; the structure of the statute presupposes the parallel operation of these 
rules.  A  court  which  ignored  conventions  in  this  context  would  risk  producing  an 
impractical interpretation of the statute.
43 
In  an  American  setting,  Barber’s  point  may  be  applied  to  both  statutory  and  constitutional 
interpretation. Interpretation that ignores conventions entirely, as in the strictly classical Diceyan 
view, would blunder about in the dark, bumping into the realities of official behavior outside the 
courts. In Ray v. Blair
44, for example, what would it mean to ignore altogether the convention – 
then more than a century old – that requires partisan political voting in the Electoral College? A 
court that attempted such a degree of self-blinding could not even understand what the parties 
were disagreeing about, let alone issue an intelligent judgment in response. 
  A second purpose or function of judicial recognition of conventions is to provide focal 
points  for  cooperation  by  political  actors.  As  we  have  seen,  a  number  of  conventions  are 
plausibly supported by some form of give-and-take, tit-for-tat cooperation by ongoing political 
actors, such as two major political parties. That intuitive idea may in turn be cashed out in 
different ways.
45 We might imagine the parties as having Prisoners’ Dilemma preferences: in a 
single-shot version of the game, each party has a dominant strategy to defect, because each 
would receive the highest payoff by defecting no matter whether the other defects or cooperates. 
Yet the parties will cooperate – very roughly speaking -- if the game is indefinitely repeated, if 
the long-run payoffs of cooperation exceed the short-run gains from defection (which implies 
that the parties do not discount the future too heavily), and if what counts as a cooperative move 
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is clearly specified and common knowledge to both. Alternatively, the parties’ first choice may 
actually be to cooperate, conditional on cooperation by the other, but each fears being made a 
chump. This is the so-called Assurance Game, or Stag Hunt, in which it can be rational to 
cooperate even in a single-shot game. In yet another interpretation, the relevant game-form is a 
Battle of the Sexes, a mix of cooperation and competition: each party prefers to act jointly with 
the other, yet the parties have different preferences over which joint action to take.  
These models may be cashed out in a number of ways and given a number of further 
specifications. In most such specifications, however, a condition for long-run cooperation to 
occur is  the existence of a focal point. It must be common knowledge – the parties know, know 
that the other knows, and so on – that a certain type of act counts as cooperation rather than 
defection. In our setting, conventions must be sufficiently well-defined that parties know whether 
the other is cooperating or not.  
This is where judicial recognition enters the picture. The role of recognition is to clarify 
the terms of cooperation, and the existence of cooperation, through the public judgment of an 
impartial tribunal – a judgment that is observable and thus common knowledge to the parties. As 
Geoffrey Marshall puts it,  
a court decision may decisively change the situation since politicians’ doubts about what 
ought  to  be  done  may  stem  not  from  uncertainty  about  whether  duty-imposing 
conventions  are  morally  binding  but  from  disagreement  as  to  whether  a  particular 
convention  does  or  does  not  exist.  .  .  .  The  decision  of  a  court  may  be  accepted  as 
decisively settling a political argument about the existence of a conventional rule.
46 
This focal-point effect of judicial recognition is not the same as binding legal enforcement. The 
judicial decision does not impose legal sanctions for violation of a convention, but instead leaves 
the  sanction  to  be  imposed  extra-judicially,  in  whatever  manner  and  by  whatever  processes 
sanctions would otherwise be imposed for violations of the convention – retaliation, political 
opprobrium, and so forth. The judicial decision does create an essential precondition for the 
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extra-judicial sanctions to occur – that the violation be common knowledge among the actors – 
but does not convert those sanctions into judicial commands. 
  A  constitutional  objection.  In  the  setting  of  federal  courts  in  the  United  States,  it  is 
plausible to worry that recognition, so defined, violates constitutional restrictions on judicial 
decisionmaking derived from Article III. If judges recognize conventions but do not enforce 
them, are they issuing pointless judgments that lack legally binding force? If so, then perhaps 
recognition of conventions amounts to nothing more than a constitutionally forbidden “advisory 
opinion.”
47 
  I believe this claim, though not at all silly, is ultimately unpersuasive. There are two 
possible  answers.  One  is  to  analogize  judicial  recognition  of  conventions  to  a  declaratory 
judgment. Critics of the declaratory judgment mechanism used to say that it amounted to nothing 
but talk; after all, it affords neither damages nor binding injunctive relief.
48 The U.S. Supreme 
Court eventually rejected such claims,
49 holding that the function of the declaratory judgment – 
dispelling uncertainty, clarifying the rights and obligations of the parties and thereby allowing or 
encouraging settlement or voluntary compliance – was not at all nugatory or pointless.
50 The 
same may be said about judicial recognition of conventions. In the focal-point function I have 
outlined, in which recognition clarifies the existence of conventions and the parties’ compliance, 
or noncompliance, with conventions, the effect of recognition is much like that of a declaratory 
judgment. In the first function I outlined, in which courts draw upon conventions as context for 
statutory interpretation, the convention is even more obviously a consequential judgment rather 
than a strictly advisory opinion. 
  This  first  answer  fits  poorly  with  the  modern  Commonwealth  theory,  however.  That 
theory  rejects  the  analogy  between  declaratory  judgments  and  judicial  recognition  of 
conventions;  the  English  judges  quashed  the  idea  in  a  famous  case,
51  although  the  U.S. 
conception of a declaratory judgment is extremely broad and may cover more territory than 
declaratory judgments do elsewhere. Whatever the status of this first answer, however, there is a 
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second, narrower answer which seems fully sufficient: judges recognize conventions only in the 
course of deciding other legal questions that represent full-blooded legal controversies. When 
judges recognize conventions as background and context for interpreting statutes, for example, 
the recognition is an ancillary byproduct of the decision of ordinary legal questions, as to which 
an ordinary binding judgment is issues. In the U.S. framework, then, the case as a whole amounts 
to a straightforward Article III “case or controversy” and there is no advisory-opinion problem 
about the judicial recognition of conventions. 
II. Assessing the Regimes 
So much for the background and statement of the problems I will address. Which of these 
views  about  the  relationship  of  conventions  to  judicial  decisionmaking  has  the  most  to 
recommend it, and under what conditions? I will suggest that the Commonwealth view is the 
least of the evils. But my route to that conclusion will be indirect. First, I will clear some ground 
by discussing some considerations that are often thought to be helpful for thinking about the 
problem  of  conventions  in  court,  yet  that  turn  out  to  be  misleading  or  erroneous  (in  II.A.). 
Second, I will explain why the incorporationist view and the classical view are untenable or 
unattractive.  The  classical  view  is  untenable  in  the  administrative  state,  where  statutes  and 
conventions collide too frequently to allow courts to ignore conventions altogether (II.B). The 
incorporationist view, on the other hand, is suspect on democratic grounds (II.C.), because of the 
inherent lack of democratic responsiveness and accountability in the generation of conventions. 
The consequence is that the modern Commonwealth view is the last man standing, the least bad 
of the alternatives.  
Although I mean to offer an argument in support of a particular view, I also hope that the 
utility of the analysis does not stand or fall with the success of that argument. I also mean to offer 
a conceptual framework for thinking about the problem of conventions in court, in the hope that 
the framework is useful and illuminating even for those who are not ultimately persuaded by the 
argument I offer. Thus the hope is to offer, in a sense, analysis in the guise of advocacy. 
A. Erroneous Considerations 
  Let me begin by clearing some ground. Discussions of conventions in court are often 
bedeviled by premises or assumptions that turn out to be quite misleading, or even downright 
erroneous.  The  general  theme  here  is  false  comparison.  The  analyst  implicitly  compares Conventions in Court 
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conventions that are indeterminate or otherwise imperfect with legal rules that are (assumed to 
be) perfectly determinate and well formed. Yet like should be compared with like, and on a 
number of dimensions, there is no general reason to think that conventions differ systematically 
from legal rules. Here are some examples. 
The  first  will  o’  the  wisp,  which  lures  many  astray,  is  the  tempting  thought  that 
conventions are systematically more vague, less well defined, than written legal rules. But this is 
an erroneous generalization, usually stemming from an implicit comparison between a precise, 
pellucid text on the one hand and a spongy convention on the other. There are indeed plenty of 
examples like that, but the constitutional landscape is also full of precise, pellucid conventions 
and constitutional texts that are notoriously spongy or indeterminate. Justice Jackson’s list of 
constitutional inkblots -- “due process,” “equal protection” and so forth -- might be compared 
with the putative Hastert Rule, a convention much invoked within the House of Representatives 
in recent years.
52 The rule holds that legislation should not pass the House unless it has the 
support of a majority of the majority party --- thus excluding winning coalitions between the 
minority party and a dissenting rump of the majority. In recent years the Hastert Rule has been 
more honored in the breach than in the observance, and may now be a dead convention,
53 but the 
political scientists can confidently count the breaches precisely because the Hastert Rule is so 
well defined. 
  In  other  cases,  conventions  have  a  well-defined  core  but  fuzzy  edges.  The  two-term 
convention for the presidency had a fair amount of open texture, as illustrated by the case of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s bid in 1912. Roosevelt’s first term (1901 to 1904, after the assassination of 
President McKinley) was partial and obtained by succession to the office rather than by election, 
and  his  third  term  would  have  been  nonconsecutive  with  the  first  two.  Did  the  two-term 
convention  apply?  The  case  was  a  hard  one.  Yet  the  two-term  convention  had  a  perfectly 
intelligible  core,  which  actually  operated  as  advertised  in  important  cases.
54  And  plenty  of 
written constitutional rules display open texture and fuzzy peripheries, as every volume of the 
U.S. Reports testifies. There is just no general reason to think that conventions and written rules 
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differ systematically in this regard, although for some reason the contrary intuition is difficult to 
dislodge.  
  Nor is there any reason to think that conventions are systematically more or less costly 
for judges to identify and interpret than are written legal rules. Indeed, from the standpoint of 
judicial competence – the analysis of judicial decision costs and error costs -- conventions may 
be an unusually easy source for judges to handle. Conventions, as usually defined and as I have 
defined them, are supposed to be widespread and generally acknowledged. The consequence is 
that serious good-faith disagreement over the existence of a convention implies that there is no 
convention.
55 (Parties in court might strategically claim that there is serious disagreement, but 
judges can ask for evidence that the disagreement occurred outside of court and predates the 
litigation.)  The  nature  of  conventions  reduces  uncertainty  about  their  existence;  and  for  the 
reasons given earlier, uncertainty about their scope and boundaries does not seem systematically 
more serious than for written legal rules. 
B. The Administrative State and the Diceyan Regime 
  If the foregoing considerations are not the right ones to focus on, we need to know what 
are the relevant considerations; we need to rethink the issues from the ground up. Analytically, 
the problem is one of collective decisionmaking for judges, where the decision involves the set 
of possible rule-regimes for the treatment of conventions in future cases. As with all decision 
problems,  the  first  step  is  to  identify  the  feasible  set  –  the  set  of  rule-regimes  which  are 
practically available, as opposed to conceptually or logically available. If we proceed in this 
fashion,  it  becomes  clear,  I  believe,  that  the  classical  Diceyan  view  –  whatever  its  intrinsic 
conceptual merits or demerits – is simply not within the feasible set of rule-regimes for judges in 
the modern administrative state. 
Dicey struggled throughout his career – which spanned the end of the 19
th century and the 
beginning of the 20
th – to come to terms with the burgeoning administrative state. The problem 
was the radical expansion of the number and density of statutory rules, including administrative 
regulations  under  statutory  authority  --  what  the  British  call  “delegated  legislation”  and 
Americans call “rulemaking.” Dicey’s view of conventions was initially formulated in and for a 
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largely  common-law  world,  with  statutes  limited  to  episodic  remediation  of  flaws  in  the 
common-law order, and generally relegated to the background. The classical view that judges 
should ignore conventions turns out to be untenable when, and because, the administrative state 
crowds the legal landscape with statutes and regulations. 
The problem is not that there are more conventions; indeed, it is possible, although not 
clearly true, that statutes and conventions are in some large-scale way substitute instruments of 
regulation, so that the more statutes there are, the more conventions are crowded out by statutes. 
The more definite and unavoidable problem is that the more statutes and regulations there are, 
the more statutes and regulations will assume knowledge of extant conventions, will implicitly 
cross-refer to conventions, or will otherwise interact with conventions. As the administrative 
state expands, judges face more and more cases in which it is simply impossible to make an 
intelligent decision, or to write an intelligible opinion, without in some way taking account of 
conventions.  
In  Free  Enterprise  Fund,  for  example,  it  is  unclear  how  a  judge  could  even  write  a 
coherent opinion, let alone a persuasive one, without explicitly or implicitly recognizing the 
convention of SEC independence. That convention pervasively shaped the significance of the 
dispute, the background expectations of the parties and lower courts and the consequences of 
ruling one way or another. It is possible, perhaps even just, to criticize the Court for using the 
device of a stipulation to say as little as possible about the convention, leaving its recognition 
entirely implicit – in contrast to the straightforward candor of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Patriation Reference. But it is not thinkable that the Court should have attempted to have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  convention  altogether.  In  Free  Enterprise  Fund,  a  classical  Diceyan 
approach  is  essentially  unthinkable.  From  the  standpoint  of  judges  and  other  constitutional 
actors,  conventions  are  like  the  weather:  ubiquitous  and  irresistible.  Extant  conventions  will 
inevitably constrain and shape written lawmaking and judicial interpretation of written laws. The 
insight of modern Commonwealth theorists is that conventions are inescapable context for the 
interpretation of written laws -- both statutory and regulatory rules and, in the American case, 
written constitutional rules.  Conventions in Court 
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C. The Democratic Deficit of Conventions 
Despite the ubiquity of conventions, judges need not directly enforce them. Although the 
crowded landscape of the administrative state requires that judges recognize conventions so as to 
be able to steer around them, nothing requires that they provide judicial sanctions in addition to 
the extra-judicial sanctions that underpin conventions. As to direct enforcement, judges have a 
real choice in the matter, and I will argue that the choice should be negative. The principal 
argument will be rooted in democratic theory: conventions are democratically suspect, and direct 
judicial enforcement would exacerbate the democratic deficit that afflicts conventions. 
I  will  begin  by  sketching  an  analytic  framework  intended  to  bring  out  the  relevant 
considerations. Classically, as in the Diceyan view, conventions are both generated and enforced 
in a decentralized fashion. Conventions “are unlike legal rules because they are not the product 
of a legislative or of a judicial process.”
56 Rather, they emerge from decentralized interactions 
among  officials,  political  parties  and  the  public;  they  are  sustained,  in  equilibrium,  by  a 
decentralized threat of sanctions or by the individual conscience.  
In the regimes we are comparing, conventions might be treated in any of three ways: 
Regime  (1):  Conventions  are  generated  and  enforced  in  decentralized  fashion  --  the 
Diceyan regime;  
Regime  (2):  Conventions  are  generated  in  a  decentralized  fashion  but  enforced  by  a 
centralized hierarchical judiciary, like the U.S. federal judiciary -- the incorporationist regime;  
Regime (3): Conventions are generated in a decentralized fashion and recognized, but not 
enforced, by the judiciary -- the modern Commonwealth regime. 
The structure of my argument will be that, from a democratic standpoint, the regimes 
should be ranked in the following order: (1)>(3)>(2). Regime (3), the incorporationist regime in 
which  conventions  are  generated  in  a  decentralized  fashion  but  enforced  by  a  centralized 
judiciary, is worst of all. Regime (1), the Diceyan regime, is best from a democratic point of 
view,  but  I  have  already  argued,  in  II.B.,  that  it  is  not  a  feasible  regime  for  courts  in  the 
administrative state. Thus regime (3), the modern Commonwealth regime, is the top ranked of 
the feasible choices and should be preferred. 
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The democratic deficit. The decentralization of constitutional norm-generation is what 
makes conventions democratically suspect. There is no well-defined office, official or institution 
who chooses among possible constitutional conventions and promulgates them. Suppose there is 
a convention that is obsolete, oppressive or unjust. There is no public body, no office, no well-
defined institutional point of access, to which one might go in order to ask for a change in the 
convention. Rather there is just the whole political system, with conventions arising as an overall 
equilibrium of the system. If the equilibrium is bad, according to some normative theory of 
constitutional and political morality, what can one do? The answer is deeply unclear.  
Conventions are equilibria, and equilibria may be bad. At a minimum, some citizens may 
have reasonable claims or arguments that the equilibrium is bad, and may seek to persuade others 
to think likewise. If that situation obtains, democracy requires that there be, at least in principle, 
some well-defined institutional mechanism by which citizens might put their claims before the 
polity,  with  at  least  a  theoretical  chance  of  persuading  fellow  citizens  to  change  the  rules 
accordingly. Where such a mechanism is lacking, the panoply of democratic values -- clear 
accountability for lawmaking, responsiveness to citizens, deliberation in common and formalized 
participation in self-government -- are all compromised. For pedagogical reasons, theorists of 
convention always begin with the simple limiting case of pure coordination equilibria, in which 
all that matters is that some choice or other be made; in such cases conventions are at their most 
valuable and the democratic objection is at its weakest. But such cases are also rare in the real 
world (driving, by the way, is not a clear example). Almost all conventions mix coordination 
with distributive consequences, as in the Battle of the Sexes, and such consequences ought to be 
subject to democratic oversight. 
Sometimes a quasi-Hayekian defense of conventions is offered: conventions represent a 
form  of  spontaneous  political  ordering,  and  spontaneous  ordering  has  valuable  properties. 
Conventions draw upon the “wisdom of crowds,”
57 resulting in epistemically superior norms. In 
a variant, the defense is quasi-Burkean: conventions represent political customs sanctified by 
tradition, and tradition impounds collective wisdom; it is the epistemic “bank and capital of 
nations, and of ages.”
58 Sometimes, the quasi-Hayekian or quasi-Burkean defenses are even cast 
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in democratic terms. The outputs of representative institutions at any given time may be an 
aberration;  the  enduring  customs  and  traditions  of  the  collective  polity,  extended  over 
generations, possess superior democratic credentials. 
Unfortunately,  claims  of  this  sort  are  at  best  overblown,  as  I  have  argued  at  length 
elsewhere. There is no general or systematic invisible-hand mechanism that makes decentralized 
norm-generation  appealing  from  the  standpoint  of  either  welfarist  or  nonwelfarist  political 
morality.
59 The wisdom-of-crowds mechanisms are too specialized, and too fragile, to support 
any  such  claims;  tradition  is  as  likely  to  embody  conformism,  cascade  effects  and  arbitrary 
power as it is to impound collective wisdom or enduring democratic values.
60 Conventions are 
equilibria, meaning merely that a unilateral departure from the convention will be sanctioned. 
But there is no providential principle that bars normatively abhorrent equilibria from arising. At 
a  minimum,  conventions  may  represent  normatively  contestable  choices  among  the  relevant 
options; is anyone confident that the two-term convention for the presidency was clearly superior 
to the competing institutional possibilities, or that the Hastert Rule is a great idea?  
The upshot is that conventions have systematically suspect democratic credentials and no 
systematic virtues to recommend them, outside of the rare cases of pure coordination equilibria. 
The  ledger  shows  a  democratic  deficit,  all  told.  There  are  several  arguments  that  would 
undermine this conclusion, but they are partly or wholly mistaken. 
Common law and statutory override. Perhaps the argument proves too much, because it 
applies with equal force to the common law. A great deal of common law incorporates sub-
constitutional conventions, such as industry custom, or general social conventions that determine 
reasonable care. Are those democratically suspect as well? Well, perhaps they are; the debates 
are very old.
61 But bracketing that larger issue, the democratic status of the sub-constitutional 
conventions incorporated into the ordinary common law is a question whose stakes are much 
lower than is the analogous question for conventions of the constitution. The stakes are lower 
because  statutes  may  override  common-law  rules  in  a  straightforward  way.  There  is  a 
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hierarchically  superior  process,  the  ordinary  legislative  process,  to  which  citizens  may  in 
principle appeal, and this limits the damage from whatever democratic deficit may arise when 
democratically suspect conventions are incorporated into the common law.  
Constitutional  conventions  and  statutory  override.  Now,  to  be  sure,  in  a  classical 
Westminster-style  regime  of  full  Parliamentary  sovereignty,  statutes  may  also  trump  even 
conventions with constitutional force – hence the locution of the Commonwealth lawyers that a 
statute may be “legal but unconstitutional.” The legislative process does satisfy the democratic 
criteria I have laid out; there is, in principle, a well-defined institution to which citizens may go 
that has the power, by formalized action, to change statutes. So if and to the extent that statutes 
may  override  conventions  of  the  constitution,  then  here  too  there  is  a  well-defined  and 
democratically appropriate procedure to which citizens may appeal. On this response, the same 
procedure that stands ready to cure the democratic deficits of conventions incorporated into the 
common  law  (whatever  they  may  be)  stands  ready  to  cure  the  democratic  deficits  of 
constitutional conventions.  
This point is inadequate as to conventions of the constitution, even if it is adequate as to 
sub-constitutional conventions incorporated into the common law (as I suggested just now). The 
problem in the constitutional setting is precisely that the statute must violate the constitutional 
convention,  must  be  unconstitutional,  in  order  to  trump  the  convention.  If  a  convention  is 
violated  by  statute  there  is,  by  definition,  a  gauntlet  of  political  sanctions  that  the  relevant 
enactment must run, and that it would not have to run if there were no such convention. That 
gauntlet is an extra cost, as it were, imposed on ordinary legislative processes by constitutional 
conventions whose genesis is democratically suspect. Legislation that overrides the common law 
need  run  no  gauntlet  at  all;  there  is  no  extra  cost,  no  extra  political  sanction,  imposed  on 
democratic  recourse  to  the  legislative  process  in  that  setting.  As  to  conventions  of  the 
constitution, then, it remains the case that there is no well-defined democratic institution or 
procedure to which citizens may turn in order to simply remove the convention, without having 
to violate it first. Rather the only way to remove it is by first violating it, if the politics will 
allow, and that is precisely what is democratically objectionable.  
Conventions based on good reasons. Another answer tries to define away the problem by 
baking  normative  content  into  conventions  themselves.  I  have  mentioned  the  theory  of Conventions in Court 
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conventions  offered  by  Sir  Ivor  Jennings,  according  to  which  conventions  require  not  only 
regular behavior backed by normative obligation, but also good reasons. Perhaps that theory 
solves the problem of bad equilibria, almost by stipulation. If the convention is bad, it is not a 
convention anyway. 
In my view, this claim merely highlights the problem with the Jennings account, which is 
that it has no theory of disagreement. Citizens may reasonably but irreducibly disagree over 
whether a convention is based on good reasons. What is the authoritative institutional procedure 
for deciding which view will prevail? There is none. The genesis of a new convention, or the 
change of an old one, must bubble up through some mysteriously decentralized process, rather 
than  being  settled  by  an  authoritative  decision-procedure  that  is  sufficiently  transparent, 
accountable  and  responsive.  More  precisely,  then,  the  Jennings  account  has  no  theory  of 
collective and cooperative action among citizens in the face of irreducible disagreement over 
what counts as a good reason for a convention – no theory of democracy. It tacitly assumes some 
sort  of  consensus,  probably  an  elite  consensus,  about  what  counts  as  a  good  reason.  That 
assumption exacerbates, rather than ameliorates, the democratic deficit. 
  Comparative  institutionalism.  One  ought  to  compare  the  democratic  deficit  of 
conventions to that of other norm-generating processes and institutions, such as legislatures. It 
might seem implausible that conventions are systematically more suspect, from a democratic 
point  of  view,  than,  say,  the  legislative  output  of  the  U.S.  Congress  –  an  institution  whose 
democratic deficits and dysfunctions are the stuff of legend. On at least one critical margin, 
however, I believe that conventions are indeed more suspect. When federal statutes are enacted, 
however severe the background deficits of the Congress, it is usually clear who the pivotal voter 
or coalition of voters will be.  
When  the  Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act  was  progressing  through  the 
Congress, the identity of pivotal voters was a matter of common knowledge, even to ordinary 
voters. In the Senate, when Scott Brown campaigned successfully for Ted Kennedy’s seat in 
Massachusetts, he signed autographs as “Scott 41” -- because if elected, he would supply the 
pivotal 41
st vote to filibuster the bill in the Senate. In the House, the final act of the drama -- 
already shaped by Brown’s pivotal filibuster vote – turned on the politics of a pivotal coalition of 
pro-life Democrats led by Representative Bart Stupak. By contrast, it is seldom clear whom the Conventions in Court 
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public may blame or praise for the genesis of conventions. Who was the “pivotal voter” or 
pivotal actor who instituted partisan voting in the Electoral College? The very question seems ill 
conceived.  Rather,  the  convention  bubbled  up  out  of  a  whirlpool  of  political  and  social 
interactions,  as  is  usually  the  case.  No  doubt  some  conventions  are  deliberately  created  by 
identifiable actors who may be held politically accountable; I have already mentioned the Hastert 
Rule. The difference is that there is a large and important class of conventions that have simply 
emerged into existence, without having been fashioned by anyone in particular. 
  Judicial  democracy?  One  might  say  that  the  judges  who  identify  and  enforce  the 
conventions are themselves selected and appointed by representative institutions and will, with 
some  time-lag,  ultimately  follow  the  election  returns,  if  only  by  virtue  of  death-with-
replacement.  This  argument  proves  too  much;  it  implies  that  anything  politically  appointed 
judges decide to do has good and sufficient democratic credentials. It is surely meaningful and 
coherent – whether or not true in any given case – to complain that the President, or a majority in 
Congress, has acted “undemocratically.” If so, then a fortiori the same sort of complaint is valid, 
whether or not true, when applied to appointed judges. And in any event, the lag time until the 
judges do follow the election returns may be so great as to make the argument cold comfort, 
democratically speaking, for any given generation. In the long run we are all democrats, but life 
is a succession of short runs. 
  If the foregoing is even roughly correct, there is a real democratic deficit surrounding 
conventions. It follows, rather more easily, that regime (2) -- the incorporationist regime, in 
which the generation of conventions is decentralized but there is centralized judicial enforcement 
-- is even worse than regime (1), the classical Diceyan regime in which both generation and 
enforcement of conventions is decentralized. Centralized enforcement of democratically-suspect 
decentralized  norms  constrains  the  ability  of  nonjudicial  actors  to  change  conventions  by 
violating them, historically a major mechanism of constitutional adjustment over time, and one 
that offers a kind of safety valve against obsolete, oppressive or unjust conventions. Indeed there 
is  something  faintly  Kafkaesque  about  a  regime  of  “constitutional”  rules  that  are  generated 
nowhere  in  particular,  by  no  one  in  particular,  that  cannot  be  changed  through  any  regular 
organized  procedure  and  that  have  no  systematic  virtues,  yet  are  rigorously  enforced  by  a 
professional  and  bureaucratized  judiciary.  It  is  as  though  the  judges  rigorously  enforced 
commands that happened to be thrown up by a Boggle word generator. Conventions in Court 
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  International  customary  law.  A  brief  word  about  international  customary  law.  The 
classical test of custom – the regular behavior of states plus opinio juris, or the sense of binding 
obligation – is essentially the same as the test for conventions.
62 And there is precisely the same 
worry about the democratic deficit of international custom. A canonical critique of customary 
international law observes that enforcing international custom in domestic courts is in severe 
tension  with  the  premises  of  representative  democracy,  because  and  to  the  extent  that 
international  custom  has  not  been  incorporated  into  law  by  the  deliberate  decision  of  a 
democratically accountable institution.
63 Whether that argument is right or wrong, as a matter of 
democratic theory or constitutional theory, is irrelevant for our purposes. The point is just that 
the issue is the same; the enforcement of domestically-generated convention by domestic courts 
faces the same democratic deficit as the enforcement of internationally-generated custom by 
domestic courts. 
Conclusion: The Nonideal Virtues of the Commonwealth View 
  My  basic  suggestion  is  that  U.S.  public  law  should  explicitly  adopt  the  modern 
Commonwealth approach, which allows courts to recognize conventions but not to enforce them. 
I have also suggested that current law already reflects this approach, to some degree, although it 
is true that there is no consistent, well-defined theory in U.S. public law about how courts should 
relate to convention in their decisionmaking. Still, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free 
Enterprise Fund is defensible, if at all, only on an implicit theory that allows conventions to be 
recognized but not enforced. 
The main argument I have offered is that the modern Commonwealth view amounts to an 
indispensable nonideal theory of judging in the administrative state – a world crowded with 
statutes,  regulations  and  conventions,  which  continually  jostle  one  another.  To  recognize 
conventions is unavoidable, because so many judicial decisions on public law will bump up 
against conventions in one way or another; strict judicial blindness to convention is not a real 
option. Yet to enforce conventions outright is normatively objectionable, principally because 
conventions suffer from a severe democratic deficit and have no systematic offsetting benefits. A 
regime in which courts have nothing to do with conventions is infeasible, and a regime in which 
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courts  actively  enforce  conventions  would  be  intolerable.  It  follows  that  the  modern 
Commonwealth view is the best of the available alternatives. It is neither fish nor fowl, neither 
the classical Diceyan regime nor the incorporationist regime. Its virtue – a large and sufficient 
virtue -- is that it is not any of the other views, which are exposed to even more powerful 
objections.  
In any event, whatever the ultimate merits of the competing regimes, I believe the crucial 
analytic issue about the role of conventions in court is the question whether norms generated 
through decentralized processes should be given centralized enforcement. So there is an analytic 
thesis here as well, one that stands or falls independently of my substantive thesis. It is perfectly 
possible,  as  a  logical  matter,  to  reject  the  substantive  view  while  accepting  the  analytic 
framework that underpins it.  